The clock is ticking. On August 12, Donald Trump’s deadline for trade talks with China expires. But there’s no guarantee the Chinese negotiators will bow to the self-styled world emperor in the White House.
The underlying reality is this: China has been quietly working to reduce its dependence on the United States and the American economy.
Take the oil sector. At U.S. oil terminals where “China ships” once came and went, activity has slowed to a crawl. Since March, the world’s largest oil importer hasn’t bought a single barrel from the United States. For the American oil industry, the fallout is serious—and for Trump, the slowdown is a symbol-laden defeat.
In his first term, Trump pushed hard to get China to buy more American oil. Instead, Beijing turned its back, leaving the U.S. with zero exports, lost contracts, and Russian oil tankers bustling in and out of Chinese ports.
In late 2020, China was buying nearly a million barrels a day from the U.S. But the trade war, Trump’s tariff hikes, and a worsening political climate have driven volumes down. When Trump reimposed a 10% tariff on Chinese goods in January, Beijing retaliated—dropping American oil from its shopping list altogether.
Behind the numbers lies strategy: China does not want to depend on a supplier it views as politically unstable. Years of mistrust, deepened by Trump’s volatile temperament, have hardened that stance.
The shift has made Russia China’s top oil supplier, with 2.2 million barrels per day—almost a fifth of its imports. Iran accounts for 13–15%, despite U.S. sanctions, moving oil through third countries and ship-to-ship transfers. Venezuela also supplies significant volumes, sometimes disguised as Brazilian exports.
For Beijing, this reorientation is as much political as economic. In today’s geopolitical climate, Russia, Iran, and Venezuela are seen as more predictable partners than the U.S.
That China prefers sanctioned suppliers—despite the logistical and diplomatic headaches—says a lot about the depth of mistrust. The world’s two largest economies are drifting apart, especially in strategically vital sectors. This isn’t full-scale “decoupling,” but it is a steady weakening of ties in key industries.
As the deadline approaches, the two sides remain far apart. What Trump will do if talks fail is anyone’s guess. At best, he may let negotiations drag on. At worst, he could slam the door and hit China with another round of sky-high tariffs.
Current U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods stand at 55%. Earlier this year, in one of Trump’s trademark outbursts, the rate briefly shot to 145%—before the decision was reversed.
The most symbolically charged dispute is over energy. Trump wants China to resume buying U.S. crude oil, liquefied natural gas, and coal. The Chinese are uninterested—and Trump has only himself to blame. How this knot gets untangled in the coming days or weeks is an open question.
Trump is also demanding greater access to China’s massive market for American goods—especially industrial and agricultural products—and lower tariffs on U.S. imports. Since May, China’s general tariff on American goods has been 10%. Beijing says Washington must first cut its own rates before expecting big purchase commitments.
The third sticking point is technology. China has long insisted on access to U.S. technology as a condition for allowing American companies into its market—a practice Washington wants ended.
U.S. negotiators also demand that Beijing scale back subsidies to its high-tech firms. The Chinese see this as a direct attack on their industrial policy, and counter with calls for easing American export controls on semiconductors and advanced manufacturing equipment.
Whatever the outcome, Trump appears to have triggered a process drawing China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and others closer together. All are members of BRICS, representing 40% of the world’s population and roughly a quarter of global GDP.
BRICS aims to boost trade and investment among members and reduce reliance on Western-dominated institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. With Trump in the Oval Office, the group has caught a fresh wind—and more nations are queuing up to join.
Playing the role of world emperor is no easy task. Others have tried and failed. Relations between the U.S. and China aren’t helped by the fact that both are led by strong-willed nationalists. Xi Jinping will not be pushed around. Since 2012, he has ruled with a firm hand and, like Trump, promised to make his country great again. The last thing he will do is humble himself before a man like Trump—which leaves him with little to concede.
Since Trump’s arrival, it has been easier for China to cast itself as an innocent victim. Yet it’s worth remembering that Beijing has long engaged in questionable practices—not just with the U.S., but with many others. China has stolen advanced Western technology on a large scale and shielded its market with countless barriers. On this point, Trump—unfortunately—has a case.
Sometimes, disputes between nations can be eased when leaders meet face to face. Here, the odds are slim. A summit between Xi and Trump might resolve some minor irritants, but not the big issues.
Xi has no interest in flying to Washington anytime soon. Nor will he roll out the red carpet for Trump in Beijing. There is simply too little to talk about.
