Donald Trump’s mobile phone is never far away when he is playing golf. Last Sunday, he spent the day at Trump National Golf Club in New Jersey. Then came the bombshell on Truth Social: “Because of my good relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, I am unhappy that the United States previously agreed to take part in joint military exercises with South Korea.”
He went on to say that the exercises were not only expensive but also “totally inappropriate,” given that North Korea had behaved respectfully during his time as president. He therefore instructed “Secretary of War” Pete Hegseth to reduce U.S. participation in a military exercise due to begin the following day.
Yes, the following day.
Trump had nothing positive to say about South Korea. He pointed out that the government in Seoul had been asked to take part in efforts to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities – and had said no. “Thank you for your attention to this matter. President Donald J. Trump.” The message was unmistakable: an ally that fails to come when Trump calls, wherever that may be, risks being severely punished.
The United States and South Korea have been close allies since the Korean War (1950–53). Today, around 28,500 American troops are stationed on South Korean soil. The annual exercises are not merely training; they are part of deterrence itself. Plans, communications, logistics and chains of command have to be tested in case North Korea once again triggers a war. The exercise now under way involves 18,000 South Korean troops and an undisclosed number of Americans.
As recently as May, Hegseth was lavish in his praise of South Korea. This came after the government in Seoul announced substantial increases in defence spending. The country currently spends around 2.4 per cent of GDP on defence but intends to raise that share to 3.5 per cent. Hegseth added that other U.S. allies would do well to learn from the South Koreans.
The timing of Trump’s intervention is also puzzling. Japanese and Western experts agree that North Korea is far more dangerous today than it was during Trump’s first term. Since nuclear negotiations collapsed in 2019, Kim Jong Un has expanded both his missile forces and his nuclear arsenal. Only a few days ago, North Korea launched new ballistic missiles. One of them travelled more than 700 kilometres before falling into the sea between Korea and Japan.
At the same time, cooperation with Russia has grown steadily closer. North Korean troops have gained combat experience fighting on Russia’s side in the war against Ukraine, while Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with weapons and ballistic missiles. Trump’s benign description of North Korea therefore bears little relation to reality.
His approach, however, is familiar. After his summit with Kim in Singapore in June 2018, he surprised everyone – even the Pentagon – by announcing a halt to major military exercises. He called them “provocative” and “unnecessary,” language that echoed North Korea’s own description. The hope was that the gesture would open the way to a major nuclear agreement.
For a few months, the atmosphere was good. Trump and Kim met three times. They exchanged warm letters, and Trump said the two had “fallen in love.” But their summit in Hanoi the following year ended without agreement. The United States demanded more nuclear disarmament than Kim was prepared to accept, while Kim demanded greater sanctions relief than Trump was willing to grant.
Since then, North Korea has continued to build up its military strength. It is nevertheless interesting that the personal connection appears to endure, not least because Trump is susceptible to flattery. Kim has repeatedly said that he has “good personal memories” of his meetings with his American counterpart. At the same time, he has made clear that fresh talks will only be possible if Washington abandons its demand for North Korean nuclear disarmament.
That is what makes Trump’s overture to Kim Jong Un so risky. In 2018, Trump could at least argue that he was exchanging a military gesture for a diplomatic opportunity. This time, the gesture comes without Kim having promised anything in return. On the contrary, the missile launches, nuclear programme and cooperation with Russia continue.
North Korea now possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the continental United States. These include, in particular, the Hwasong-17 and Hwasong-18, and probably the newer Hwasong-19 as well. Experts estimate the range of the first two at around 15,000 kilometres – more than enough to reach large parts of the United States.
South Korea is, naturally, the most exposed. Its security rests not only on American military strength but also on the political will of the United States to use it. Alliances ultimately depend on credibility. If an American president can scale back an important military exercise in South Korea because the country refuses to take part in an American war in the Middle East, the question arises as to what other demands might later be attached to the security guarantee.
Nor is South Korea alone in its concern. Other American allies are also struggling to interpret the confusing signals coming from Washington. The Trump administration has repeatedly insisted that Asia and the Pacific are central to American defence planning. Yet the war with Iran is drawing ever more U.S. military power towards the Middle East. The aircraft carrier USS George Washington is now heading from the western Pacific to waters near Iran to relieve the USS Abraham Lincoln. As a result, East Asia will for a time be without an American aircraft carrier, even as China increases pressure on its neighbours.
In Beijing and Pyongyang, some will be smiling from ear to ear. Both Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un seek to weaken the American presence in the region. That may take time. For now, it is enough that U.S. allies begin to doubt their powerful partner. That makes it easier for Xi to sow division and draw them into China’s political sphere.
Trump may, of course, have a larger diplomatic game in mind. He has repeatedly said that he wants fresh talks with Kim, and scaling back the joint exercises may be intended as a signal that the door remains open. A renewed dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang would in itself be welcome if it reduced the danger of war. But diplomacy works best when both sides give something. So far, North Korea has given nothing at all.
The Korean War began in 1950 with North Korea’s sudden attack on South Korea. By the time it ended three years later, around three million soldiers and civilians had lost their lives. The peninsula then had a population of around 30 million. Today, 78 million Koreans live in an area roughly two-thirds the size of mainland Norway.
That gives some idea of just how extraordinarily deadly a new Korean War could be – with or without the use of nuclear weapons.
