Will he? Won’t he?
Donald Trump is in a quandary. During his visit to China last week, he received a clear message from his otherwise affable host, President Xi Jinping: If the United States continues to support Taiwan, the two superpowers could end up in “a dangerous place.” “I listened to him, but chose not to respond,” Trump said on the flight home to Washington.
It is not often that the blusterer in the White House chooses to remain silent, but for once he did the right thing.
In January, Congress approved a weapons package for Taiwan worth 14 billion dollars. Trump has not yet signed the bill, but will he do so? On the return journey, he merely said that he would make up his mind quite soon. The problem is that whatever he does, he will face a storm of criticism. If he bows to Xi, he will win applause from China but provoke an outcry both in Taiwan and at home. If he signs, he risks wrecking America’s relationship with China for a long time to come.
Taiwan cannot manage on its own. Although the island is an economic success story, it is entirely dependent on American weapons — especially at a time when China is arming itself at a rapid pace and threatening to “liberate” the island’s 25 million inhabitants. Xi Jinping has said that the People’s Liberation Army must be ready to invade the island next year. That does not mean the invasion will take place then, but the government in Taipei regards the threat as real.
Trump’s two-day visit to Beijing was naturally followed with eagle eyes in Taiwan. Now the islanders are breathing a sigh of relief because Trump made no promises to Xi. Yet unease is greater than before because Trump is treating the weapons package as a bargaining chip. “It’s a very good card for us, frankly, because it involves a lot of weapons,” he told Fox News after returning home.
Trump has not said what concessions he will demand in return, but he is eager for China to buy more American goods and put pressure on Iran. Trump and Congress already approved a separate 11-billion-dollar weapons package for Taiwan in December. Beijing responded by conducting close-range live-fire drills around the island.
Taiwan’s defence budget has almost quadrupled over the past seven years, but the government faces strong opposition in the legislature, where the opposition wields considerable power. In recent weeks, the two camps have quarrelled over a supplementary defence budget without reaching agreement. For years the island has been governed by the Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, which has at times toyed with the idea of declaring Taiwan an independent state. That is not to the liking of the opposition, led by the Kuomintang, or KMT, which is more concerned with dialogue with the regime in Beijing.
When Mao and the communists won in 1949, the KMT leaders and their supporters fled to Taiwan. They then ruled the island continuously for 51 years, until the turn of the millennium — for much of that time under emergency laws.
Paradoxically, the KMT still dreams of national reconciliation. As recently as last month, Cheng Li-wun, the party’s female leader, visited the mainland. Before her departure, she said the visit would show that peace and reconciliation were not as difficult as the DPP government claimed. The highlight was her meeting with Xi Jinping in the Great Hall of the People, where she again stressed the importance of dialogue.
Xi used the meeting to repeat that people on both sides of the strait are “Chinese,” and that Taiwan belongs to the People’s Republic of China. He also underlined that Beijing would “absolutely not” tolerate Taiwanese independence.
The trip caused great controversy in Taiwan. The DPP accused the KMT of joining China’s efforts to weaken the island’s defence capability, especially because the opposition was at the same time obstructing the government’s proposal for new defence appropriations. The political noise in Taipei is, of course, noticed in Beijing, which seizes every opportunity to fish in troubled waters — among other things by inviting prominent Taiwanese figures to the mainland, where they are entertained with every courtesy. Taiwanese newspapers recently wrote that more than a thousand “personalities” visited the mainland last year.
The authorities have repeatedly warned against these trips, claiming that they may endanger the island’s security. Others argue that they are important at a time when relations are so tense.
The United States and Taiwan have not had diplomatic relations since 1979, when Washington broke with Taipei and recognised the People’s Republic of China. The historic shift took place under President Jimmy Carter, who defended the decision by referring to “political realities.” Relations with Taiwan were then regulated by the so-called Taiwan Relations Act, which Congress passed the same year. The law was designed to ensure that the United States could still maintain close, though unofficial, ties with Taiwan. It also allowed for continued American arms sales to the island.
The parties do not, however, have a defence treaty, and the United States has made no promise to intervene on Taiwan’s side if the island is attacked. What the Americans will do when it comes to the crunch is, in practice, entirely open. This is the essence of America’s so-called strategic ambiguity.
There is no doubt that this ambiguity has had a deterrent effect on China. But will it have the same effect if Taiwan is denied the weapons the island believes it needs? Strategic ambiguity works only when it is accompanied by practical clarity: regular arms deliveries, training, ammunition and an American presence in the region. Ambiguity over whether the United States will go to war for Taiwan is one thing. Ambiguity over whether the United States will even provide Taiwan with weapons for self-defence is something else entirely.
That is why Donald Trump’s next move is so important. Much suggests that he will wait until after Xi Jinping’s return visit to the United States in September before deciding what to do about the weapons package. In that way, he can calm tempers in both Beijing and Taipei. But he will not escape the awkward issue, and Xi — now stronger than ever — will be watching it with a hawk’s eye. In the worst case, Xi could strike back with perhaps his strongest weapon against the United States: rare earths.
China has a near-monopoly on the extraction and refining of these vital minerals. Without them, the United States cannot make weapons for Taiwan or anyone else — not even for itself. That, in a nutshell, is the situation.
