The sentences were handed down by a military court and announced on Thursday.
Wei served as defence minister from 2018 to 2023, while Li, his successor, remained in office for only eight months. Both have been given a two-year reprieve. In practice, this means that their sentences will be commuted to life imprisonment.
The court found them guilty of serious corruption, both for accepting bribes and for bribing others.
Under Mao, the Chinese people were required to sing songs of praise to the People’s Liberation Army. In Xi Jinping’s era, they have more than enough to digest in the constant revelations of fraud and skulduggery within the officer corps. Since 2022 alone, more than one hundred senior officers have been arrested and punished, among them 36 generals. Others have vanished without a trace.
In recent months, the purges have reached unimaginable heights. Even the Communist Party’s Central Military Commission has been hit. Of its seven members, five have been arrested and placed under investigation. The drama peaked in January when Zhang Youxia, the commission’s vice chairman, was thrown out. He had a long military career and was for many years described as “a true revolutionary.” Now only two members remain: party leader Xi Jinping, who also chairs the commission, and Zhang Shengmin.
The commission plays an exceptionally important role in China’s political system. It is appointed by the Communist Party’s Central Committee and serves as the link between the party and the armed forces. When it is paralysed and nothing happens, it means that something has gone wrong.
The People’s Liberation Army was founded in 1927 under the name the Red Army. When Mao and his men triumphed in 1949, much of the credit went to the hundreds of thousands of Red soldiers who had suffered and bled for more than two decades. The following year, in 1950, they were thrown into the three-year Korean War — again at great cost.
Later, China entered calmer waters, and by the time Mao died in 1976, the PLA had become both poorly trained and old-fashioned. Western observers described it as “the world’s largest military museum.”
The chairman’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, was quick to conclude that something had to be done. Since then, the government has spent enormous sums modernising the armed forces, especially in recent years under Xi Jinping.
In 2012, the year Xi took the helm, China spent 670 billion yuan — about 1,005 billion Norwegian kroner — on military purposes. Last year, the defence budget was more than twice as large. During this phase, with major purchases of weapons and equipment, vast sums of money have been in circulation.
Under such conditions, many may be tempted to steal from the public purse. But as chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi is not without responsibility for what has happened, since all the big fish caught in the net were appointed by him.
Earlier corruption cases in the military ranks illustrate how large the sums involved can be. After Xu Caihou, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, was arrested in 2014, he was accused of having pocketed cash, gold and properties. The total value was estimated at 400–500 million yuan.
His successor, Guo Boxiong, was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2016. According to court documents, he received around 80 million yuan. Several family members also accepted bribes, meaning that many more millions disappeared into thin air.
It is said that Xu and Guo controlled the promotion system in the armed forces, turning titles and ranks into commodities. As a result, it was not always the most capable who rose through the ranks. The outcome was poorer military leadership and a weakened defence.
Xi Jinping has long warned that the armed forces must be ready to “liberate” Taiwan next year. But are they? In light of the recent drama, it seems as if the forces have more than enough to do cleaning up their own ranks.
The People’s Liberation Army consists of around two million personnel, and it is no secret that the entire system — including the party — is permeated by corruption. Xi Jinping himself has no military background, but throughout his years in power he has gone to great lengths to assert his authority in the barracks. The question many are asking is whether he is struggling to be heard.
In China, it is taken as settled truth that the Communist Party stands above the armed forces. Or, as Mao put it: “The party must command the gun.” Yet is it conceivable that there are centres of power within the PLA that are going their own way? Perhaps even for professional reasons?
In countries of China’s kind, it is not unusual for the ruling elite to fabricate accusations of corruption. This means that the dismissals — at least some of them — may be due to other factors. Even professional disagreement may be interpreted by Xi as disloyalty and a breach of party discipline. Such disagreements may concern the pace of military modernisation, the choice of weapons systems and which branches of the armed forces should be given priority — and, not least, the strategy toward Taiwan.
When Donald Trump lands in Beijing in the middle of the month, Taiwan will be high on the agenda. Once again, Xi will ask the United States to keep its fingers out of the pie and leave the island to China. But however unpredictable Trump may be, there is nothing to suggest that he will agree to a “deal” over the heads of the regime in Taipei. America’s strategy of maintaining a strong military presence in East Asia appears to remain firmly in place. That means continued high tension in the Taiwan Strait — and the risk of unintended acts of war.
On 1 August next year, the People’s Liberation Army will turn 100. In Beijing, preparations for the celebration are already under way, and the Chinese people can look forward to both parades and grand speeches.
But Xi Jinping will probably have to wait before taking Taiwan back. First, he must put his own house in order.