torsdag 16. april 2026

Torbjørn Færøvik: Tehran Under Watch - China’s Surveillance Grip on Iran

Tehran is no longer what it once was, say travelers who have recently returned from Iran. Under normal circumstances, the Iranian capital is a bustling metropolis. But this spring, it seems as though people are tiptoeing around street corners, for no one knows what the day—or tomorrow—may bring. 

When Donald Trump went to war with Iran, he urged the country’s 93 million inhabitants to rise up. Instead, they have remained quiet. The reasons may be many. In wartime, most people have enough to do simply managing their daily lives. Moreover, they are painfully aware that the price of raising a fist can be extremely high—in the worst case, death.

China, too, is helping to keep the Iranians in check. In Tehran and other cities, they are monitored by Chinese-made cameras from morning till night. Equipped with facial recognition, the cameras can identify anyone who steps out of line.
In a country like Iran, they are also used to expose women who violate social norms and religious rules. “Respected citizen!” begin the text messages women receive. “We have registered that you have not complied with the rules for proper use of the hijab. Repeated violations will have legal consequences.”

In this way, the state gains a tool that not only reacts to deviations but also prevents them through a constant, invisible presence.

For years, Iran’s ayatollahs have maintained a close relationship with China’s authoritarian system. As early as the 2000s, the first Iranian delegations traveled to study Chinese surveillance in practice. Companies such as Huawei, Dahua, ZTE, and Hikvision offered their expertise, and the first contracts were signed.

Several years later, in 2015, the police authorities of both countries entered into a cooperation agreement. China promised to provide Iran with “new technological insight” through training programs and “social practice.” Since then, personnel from both countries have traveled back and forth between Beijing and Tehran.

After the protests in 2022, Iran imported even more equipment from China. Some reports have mentioned the deployment of up to 15,000 new cameras in Tehran alone. For Chinese manufacturers, these deliveries mean substantial profits. Chinese experts have also assisted the regime in taming the Internet—and in shutting it down whenever internal or external threats arise.

Such knowledge is worth its weight in gold in turbulent times. Already in January, after several days of demonstrations, the authorities cut internet access in the largest cities. Since the outbreak of war on February 28, traffic has been reduced to almost nothing, according to NetBlocks, a company that monitors developments day by day.

Iran is just one of many countries seeking Chinese surveillance technology. Authoritarian regimes on every continent are lining up to acquire the latest solutions. Russia, North Korea, Vietnam, and Myanmar are among the most eager. In the Middle East, besides Iran, countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are prominent buyers. In Africa, the new technology is gaining a foothold through China’s controversial infrastructure programs, and to some extent also in Latin America.

In Europe, Serbia has become a showcase for China’s push. Companies such as Dahua and Hikvision are deeply embedded in the market. The capital, Belgrade, is one of the most heavily surveilled cities on the continent. Thousands of cameras, mounted on walls and lampposts, are equipped with facial recognition technology. Many residents have protested, but to little effect.

During Viktor Orbán’s long tenure, Hungary also became a testing ground for the new technology. Huawei and ZTE have long been dominant there, and Chinese companies have invested heavily in several sectors. When the European Commission three years ago threatened to withhold earmarked funds from Hungary, Orbán shrugged and said: “Never mind—I have China.” What line the new government will take remains unclear.

In reality, Chinese surveillance technology has gained a foothold in most European countries, including Norway. Careless politicians bear part of the responsibility. A survey conducted by NRK in 2024 showed that 128 Norwegian municipalities had installed Chinese-made equipment. The cameras are adjustable and can zoom in on faces when needed. They are also found in the private sector because they are considered affordable and effective. The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) has on several occasions warned against this development, with limited impact.

The EU’s strategy is to reduce exposure to China through political guidelines and new legislation. In 2024, the EU adopted a law targeting artificial intelligence. It classifies facial recognition and biometric surveillance as both risky and undesirable. This means that EU countries have very limited scope to use such technology in public spaces, which will weaken the market for Chinese suppliers.

In China, surveillance equipment generates staggering revenues. For the Communist Party, advanced technology has become an indispensable instrument of power. Whenever a spark threatens to ignite a fire, the “people’s police” move in in full force. Under such conditions, it becomes almost impossible to organize protests or a political opposition.

Surveillance is particularly intense in the western region of Xinjiang, long marked by unrest. There, companies such as Huawei and Hikvision have deployed a type of facial recognition that can also identify ethnicity. This makes it easier to distinguish the Muslim Uyghurs from the majority population. The Uyghurs, of Turkic origin, make up about half of the region’s 25 million inhabitants. Surveillance is also extensive in Tibet.

In Iran, the war is now in its seventh week. Although the regime appears intact, the strain is considerable. “If the regime survives, it should remember to send a warm thank-you to China,” writes a commentator on the website The Diplomat.

But China’s support for the ayatollahs will likely stop at camera technology. If the regime collapses, Chinese leaders will most likely remain passive. China is not prepared to act as the world’s policeman—and Tehran is too far from Beijing.