fredag 6. mars 2026

Torbjørn Færøvik: Opening Pandora’s Jar. The War With Iran

You have heard of Pandora, the woman who lifted the lid from the jar?

In Greek mythology it is said that the gods gave her a jar filled with all the world’s misfortunes. She was therefore strictly instructed to keep it closed. But her curiosity proved too strong. When she lifted the lid, disease, strife, sorrow and suffering flew out, and the world was never the same again. Only one thing remained at the bottom of the jar: hope.

The expression “to open Pandora’s jar” has since been used to describe an action that sets off a chain of events no one can control. The United States’ bombing of Iran may turn out to be precisely such a moment. In Washington the attacks are presented as necessary and limited. Their primary purpose is said to be the destruction of military installations, missile bases and whatever may remain of the country’s nuclear program.



But once a war has begun, it can easily unleash reactions, counter-reactions and unpredictable developments. It is precisely this dynamic that brings Pandora and her jar to mind.

Iran has roughly ninety million inhabitants and a territory of more than 1.6 million square kilometers. The country is therefore about four and a half times larger than Norway. Mountain ranges, desert regions and vast distances make it difficult to control without a massive military presence. History shows that air power alone is rarely sufficient to force a state to its knees. Bombers can destroy military targets, but they cannot easily create political order on the ground.

This is an old dilemma in modern warfare. During the Vietnam War the United States dropped about 7.6 million tons of bombs over Indochina from 1964 to 1973. The bombardment remains the most intense in history and was far greater than the total bombing during the Second World War. Yet the war ended in a humiliating defeat for the United States, which in 1975 had to withdraw from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Iran will be no easy match. The capital, Tehran, also enjoys natural defensive advantages in wartime. The city lies at the foot of the Alborz mountain range, which stretches along northern Iran toward the Caspian Sea. The mountains rise steeply just north of the city, with peaks exceeding five thousand meters. The highest, Mount Damavand, is a dormant volcano and Iran’s tallest mountain. This means that Tehran lies within a natural semicircle of mountains to the north, while the landscape opens southward toward the Iranian plateau and vast desert regions.

Modern military experience shows that large cities are extremely difficult to conquer. Fighting in densely populated urban areas leads to heavy losses even for technologically superior forces. The history of cities such as Mosul, Fallujah and Mariupol demonstrates how prolonged and bloody such battles can become. A “heroic” American ground operation to crush the clerical leadership in Tehran? Forget it.

It should also be noted that Iran’s armed forces consist of around 600,000 soldiers and at least 200,000 reservists.

Some have pointed out that American forces in 2003 managed to capture Baghdad relatively quickly. But Iraq had around 25 million inhabitants and relatively flat terrain. Iran is almost four times as populous and far more geographically complex. Any American general with a sense of realism would therefore hesitate before sending his troops into Tehran.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a religious dictatorship, governed by a complicated system of clerical and revolutionary institutions. At the top stands the Supreme Leader, but power also rests with the Revolutionary Guard, the security services and a large network of political and religious organizations. It is not easy to dismantle such a system from the outside. The regime has survived wars, sanctions and repeated periods of internal unrest since the revolution of 1979. Experience shows that authoritarian systems can be more resilient than many believe.

Rumors in Tehran claim that Ayatollah Khamenei’s son, the 57-year-old Mojtaba Khamenei, may be in the process of taking over power. We do not know what will happen. In any case the clerical establishment has plenty of ayatollahs to choose from; there are said to be more than three hundred of them.

At the same time there is no doubt that many Iranians hate the present regime. Demonstrations have shaken the country several times in recent years. Women have protested against the compulsory hijab, students against political repression, and workers against an economy marked by inflation and unemployment. Images of young people defying the regime in the streets have nourished hopes of an imminent popular uprising.

But popular uprisings rarely arise on command – and almost never in the middle of a war. When bombs fall, the priorities of ordinary people change. Many have enough simply coping with fear. Iranians also know what can happen when a state collapses. They have seen the wars in Iraq, Syria and Libya. In such moments even an authoritarian regime may appear as protection against something far worse.

One week after the war began, it remains an open question where a popular uprising might come from. The opposition is fragmented and divided. Some groups want reforms within the system, others seek to overthrow the Islamic Republic entirely. Some operate in exile, others in secrecy inside the country. For a regime to fall, discontent must coalesce into a broad and organized movement. That process is difficult to bring about with bombs.

There is also a danger that the war will strengthen the most conservative forces in Iran. History offers many examples of war leading to greater militarization and stricter control. The regime has imported surveillance equipment worth billions from China. The Revolutionary Guard may gain greater influence, and nationalism may become a powerful mobilizing force. If that happens, the result could be an even more closed and confrontational regime.

Regional consequences must also be considered. Iran is not isolated. The country has connections with militias and political groups in several parts of the Middle East. The war could therefore unleash dangerous forces in neighboring countries, particularly because of Iran’s role as a major exporter of oil and gas.

The Strait of Hormuz lies only a few dozen miles from Iran’s coastline. If the war escalates there, the repercussions will be enormous. Around twenty million barrels of oil pass through the strait every day – roughly one fifth of the world’s daily consumption. A similar share of liquefied natural gas also passes through the strait, which is only forty kilometers wide. If there is any consolation, it is that Asia has the most to fear, since 80–85 percent of the oil and gas goes to countries such as China, India, Japan and South Korea.

It is precisely this chain of unforeseen events that brings the eternally young Pandora and her jar to mind. Strategies that appear precise and controlled on paper can in reality lead to even greater misfortune and chaos.

Yet, as in the myth, there is also an element of hope. Hope may lie in the possibility that the crisis forces political solutions that we cannot yet see. Perhaps something still remains hidden at the bottom of the jar.