onsdag 29. oktober 2025

Torbjørn Færøvik: Soybeans and Superpower Politics. Xi and Trump’s High-Stakes Meeting

In the spring of 1985, a young Chinese man named Xi Jinping lived in the small town of Muscatine, Iowa. He was on a study trip and lodged with an American host family.

Xi slept in a simple boy’s room, ate at the kitchen table, and observed how Midwestern farmers grew corn and soybeans on a scale that left a deep impression on him. The machinery was modern, the storage facilities immense, the store shelves full. He took note of it all, but said little.

To his hosts, he appeared quiet, polite, and curious.

“He liked our popcorn,” recalled his hostess, Eleanor Dvorchak. “He sat on the couch and smiled while we watched TV together. There was nothing stiff about him.”

Today, he is China’s powerful president and party leader. And once again soybeans are at the center—no longer as a source of curiosity, but as a bargaining chip in the rivalry with the United States. When Xi meets Donald Trump in Seoul tomorrow, soybean trade will be one of several issues. Trump wants China to import more American farm products, especially soybeans, grown on millions of acres in Iowa and neighboring states.

For years China bought soybeans from the U.S., but halted imports in June—apparently in response to Trump’s aggressive trade policy. The decision has hit American soybean farmers hard, and many blame Trump for the predicament they now face.

But the rivalry is about far more than soybeans. Trump wants balance in trade with China, not the large deficit that exists today. That can only happen if U.S. companies gain freer access to the Chinese market and if Beijing reduces or removes subsidies for its rapidly growing industries.

Trump is also demanding that China ease its export restrictions on rare earth elements, which American high-tech industries depend on. Today, China controls almost all production and processing of these metals. And not least, Trump wants to use the opportunity to speak up for America’s soybean farmers. If he fails, they may turn against him in next year’s midterm elections.

Xi, for his part, approaches the demands with cold calculation. He knows Trump needs results, and that Midwestern soybean farmers form an important voting bloc. By resuming a portion of soybean imports, Xi can hand Trump a victory that costs China little, while easing pressure in the negotiations. But on core issues like state subsidies and industrial policy, Xi has nothing to concede. Subsidies are a national matter that form the very foundation of China’s modernization project.

The battle over rare earths is a good example of how China uses its advantages strategically. For years Beijing has threatened to restrict exports to the U.S., fully aware that American companies rely on these metals for everything from batteries to military equipment. This gives Xi a strong bargaining chip in his meeting with Trump, and the message is clear: China can make life very difficult for American industry if Trump pushes too far.

The coming meeting will also reflect the starkly different personalities of the two leaders. Xi is calm, controlled, and methodical. He thinks long-term, building his power through the party’s well-oiled machinery. Trump is his exact opposite: loud, impulsive, focused on quick wins and media images that cast him as the victor.

This contrast creates an imbalance at the negotiating table. While Trump is under pressure to deliver results, Xi can rely on his stoic patience to stretch out the process and gain the upper hand.

History from earlier meetings confirms this pattern. When Trump visited Beijing in 2017, he praised Xi and placed the blame for America’s trade deficit on previous U.S. presidents. “I don’t blame China,” he said. “Who can blame a country for taking care of its own citizens?” At later meetings, Trump’s tone has been the same—friendly, even flattering. The criticism usually came later, at a safe distance. But then, at times, it was sharp.

The situation now is more tense than it was eight years ago. The trade war is deeper, and both sides have inflicted economic pain on each other. China has much to lose if exports to the U.S. collapse, but Beijing is working hard to find new markets and boost domestic consumption.

At the same time, the U.S. depends on Chinese imports, whether consumer electronics, components, or rare earths. This mutual dependence means that neither side can afford a full confrontation.

Most likely, the Seoul meeting will not produce a breakthrough. Xi may promise to increase imports of American soybeans and other farm goods, allowing Trump to claim triumph and boast of a “fantastic deal.” Beyond that, the two sides will likely agree to keep talking and, for the moment, avoid new tariff hikes. Other, larger geopolitical questions will have to wait.

Already in his first term, Trump got a taste of China’s stubbornness and strength. He began by inviting Xi to his lavish Florida estate, where cordial words were exchanged. But in the trade talks that followed, the Chinese had little or nothing to concede. The suspicion that the deadly coronavirus originated in China did nothing to improve relations. Meanwhile, Beijing continued to rearm rapidly, threaten Taiwan, and act provocatively in the South China Sea.

Today, there is no doubt:

China intends to become a superpower on par with the United States—not only economically, but also technologically and militarily. Trump understands this. He seems determined to maintain America’s strong military presence in the western Pacific, where the U.S. has key allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. During his visit to Japan yesterday, he underscored this intent by visiting the U.S. aircraft carrier USS George Washington, stationed just south of Tokyo.

China, for its part, wants the U.S. out of the region—if not tomorrow, then over time. In other words, we are facing a superpower conflict that is about much more than soybeans and tariffs. The Chinese navy’s steady expansion in the South China Sea is a clear sign of Beijing’s ambitions. The same goes for its growing activity in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. Wherever China develops economic interests, its gunboats are never far behind.

Rewind to 1985, when Xi sat at the kitchen table in Muscatine, and the contrast becomes clear. That year, China’s nominal GDP was just 7 percent of America’s. Today, it is 64 percent. Measured by purchasing power, China has already surpassed the U.S. by a wide margin.

“You have no cards!” Trump shouted at Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky in February during their infamous clash at the White House. He will not be able to say the same to Xi Jinping when they meet tomorrow. China holds many cards in its hand.