The Indian prime minister had traveled to Tianjin, a city near Beijing, to attend a summit convened by Xi. Leaders from 25 other countries also joined the discussions under the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a loose grouping of states China seeks to keep within its orbit.
China and India may be neighbors, but their relationship has long been strained. Modi’s visit to Beijing was therefore far from a given. What tipped the scales was America’s newly imposed 50 percent tariff on Indian goods. Ever the strategist, Modi seized the chance to signal to Washington that India has more than one option on the table.
Trump had only stoked Modi’s resolve before the trip, declaring that India’s economy was “dead”—as dead as Russia’s. The reality is very different: since 2015 India’s GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 7.8 percent, compared with just 2.5 percent in the U.S. Anyone tracking Asia knows India is one of the world’s great engines of growth—and a market brimming with opportunity.
That dynamism is also evident in India’s trade surplus with the U.S., which topped $45 billion last year. Trump has little patience for such imbalances. When he raised tariffs on Indian exports in August, he also pointed to India’s reliance on cheap Russian oil. “Unacceptable,” he thundered. “Russia must be punished, not rewarded.”
Xi and Modi have met only twice in the last six years, with little to show for it. Their countries remain locked in a long-running border dispute: 3,400 kilometers of rugged Himalayan frontier. But last month the two sides did agree to reopen border trade and establish direct flights—tentative steps in the right direction.
At independence in 1947, India’s leaders pledged to steer clear of power blocs and pursue an independent course. That policy held for decades. But China’s rising power has made the balancing act harder. For years, Modi has sought closer ties with the U.S.—not just in trade but also in intelligence-sharing and joint military exercises. Yet India has never considered a formal defense alliance with Washington.
The sudden tariff hikes hit like a bucket of cold water. When Modi visited the White House in February, the atmosphere had been warm. Trump showered him with praise, saying relations had never been better.
The honeymoon didn’t last. Two months later came Trump’s self-styled “Day of Liberation,” when he slapped high tariffs on dozens of countries. India was hit with 25 percent duties—and in August, another 25 percent was added, seemingly out of nowhere. The dismissive comments about India that followed caused shock and anger in New Delhi, sending Modi and his team into a period of quiet deliberation.
They’ve now emerged. The message: India will not end its oil trade with Russia. Ties between Delhi and Moscow have historically been strong, and Putin’s authoritarianism hasn’t altered that. India simply doesn’t produce enough oil for its needs. It must buy abroad, and price is what matters.
Russia, isolated by Western sanctions, has been offering steep discounts. Last year, a third of India’s crude imports came from Russia. In recent weeks, Russian Urals oil has been selling $3–4 cheaper per barrel than other available grades; earlier in the Ukraine war, the gap was even wider. Modi has said bluntly he’ll buy from anyone—“even the devil”—if it serves India’s interests.
His foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, a seasoned strategist and author of weighty tomes on Indian diplomacy, strikes the same chord. If Mahatma Gandhi were alive, he might have infused India’s foreign policy with moral principle. Modi and Jaishankar insist such luxuries are unaffordable in today’s brutal world. Survival requires pragmatism.
Trump, for his part, seems oblivious to the scale of India’s economy—it is now the fourth largest in the world. His tariffs will hurt vulnerable sectors such as textiles and apparel, but hardly sink the nation. Growth this year may be shaved by a single percentage point. Meanwhile, Delhi is accelerating efforts to diversify its markets and weighing tax breaks for the hardest-hit industries.
Some commentators have speculated that India might drift closer to China after Modi’s meeting with Xi. That is highly unlikely. India wants pragmatic cooperation with as many partners as possible—including China—but the gulf between them, rooted in history, religion, politics, and a heavily militarized border, makes any real alliance unimaginable.
Modi also knows Trump may be gone from the political stage in just three and a half years, replaced perhaps by a more rational and predictable occupant of the White House.
And then again, Trump might pivot sooner. Just last Thursday, he raged on social media: “Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to darkest China. May they have a long and prosperous future together!” Yet by Friday he was calling Modi “a great prime minister” and insisting relations were “special.” “Nothing to worry about!”
Such about-faces underline how unpredictable today’s America has become.
For big and small nations alike, the lesson is the same: when dealing with Washington, it may be wisest to sit tight, ride out the storm, and diversify one’s bets. India, at least, seems to have learned that lesson well.
And then again, Trump might pivot sooner. Just last Thursday, he raged on social media: “Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to darkest China. May they have a long and prosperous future together!” Yet by Friday he was calling Modi “a great prime minister” and insisting relations were “special.” “Nothing to worry about!”
Such about-faces underline how unpredictable today’s America has become.
For big and small nations alike, the lesson is the same: when dealing with Washington, it may be wisest to sit tight, ride out the storm, and diversify one’s bets. India, at least, seems to have learned that lesson well.
