On a late August weekend in 2017, a week after he was forced out as President Trump’s chief strategist, Stephen K. Bannon made a trip to the Connecticut country house of Henry A. Kissinger to talk about China. It was more of a pilgrimage, actually: the prophet of disruption seeking out the high priest of geopolitics to make the case that Mr. Kissinger’s view of America’s relationship with China was hopelessly out of date. The two men talked for hours in the sunroom, and while they enjoyed each other’s company, they did not, in the end, see eye to eye.
“He agreed 100 percent with my analysis,” Mr. Bannon recalled, “but he disagreed with my conclusions because they were too blunt force.” Mr. Kissinger confirmed this account, saying he told his visitor that the United States and China must strive for the “partial cooperation of countries that by normal standards might be considered enemies.”
“He agreed 100 percent with my analysis,” Mr. Bannon recalled, “but he disagreed with my conclusions because they were too blunt force.” Mr. Kissinger confirmed this account, saying he told his visitor that the United States and China must strive for the “partial cooperation of countries that by normal standards might be considered enemies.”